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A

WOLF
Sheep’s

in

Clothing:

Wolf v. Ashcroft and the Constitutionality of Using the
MPAA Ratings to Censor Films in Prison
- By Colin Miller*

Censorship is an odious enterprise. We
oppose censorship and classification by
governments because they are alien to
the American tradition of freedom.
Much of this nation’s strength and
purpose is drawn from the premise that
the humblest of citizens has the
freedom of his own choice. Censorship
destroys this freedom of choice.1

I

n 2001, prisoners in Pennsylvania challenged
a prison policy prohibiting them from watching films
rated R, X, or NC-17. The prison policy was designed
to implement the Zimmer Amendment, 2 which
denies funding to any prison that shows R, X, or
NC-17 films.3 After the District Court denied the
prisoners’ claims in a cursory opinion, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded for a more
fact-sensitive analysis.
Ostensibly, the eventual disposition of this
case may appear rather unimportant. Many may
question why much attention should be paid to
whether prisoners should have the right to view

certain films; however, there are actually several
important questions raised by this case and other
cases dealing with the Zimmer Amendment. Initially,
courts have traditionally held that the MPAA ratings
lack any clear standards and that they are legally
unenforceable. If a court upholds the provision of
the Zimmer Amendment that prohibits funding to
prisons showing R, X, or NC-17 films, it will
essentially be saying that the MPAA ratings can be
used by certain governmental agencies to censor
films. This is diametrically opposed to the central
purposes of the MPAA ratings: establishing selfregulation and curbing government censorship.
Despite federal courts’ gradual recognition
of their role in vindicating prisoners’ rights in the
1960s, the courts are increasingly deferring to the
government when crafting prison policies. The
Zimmer Amendment, and the Pennsylvania prison
policy based on it, have presented the federal courts
with an opportunity to play a leading role again in
vindicating prisoners’ rights.4 Both the Zimmer
Amendment and the Pennsylvania policy were
apparently passed to punish prisoners, despite there
being no factual findings that the laws actually
advanced any penological interests. While the
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District Court failed to reach the right result on its
initial review, it now has the opportunity on remand
to hold that the government’s sole reliance on the
MPAA ratings was
improper and that the
regulations in question
were unconstitutional.
Part I of this
article looks at the
history of the federal
courts’ jurisprudence in
deciding prisoner’s rights
cases, culminating in the
current test adopted in
Turner v. Safley. Part II
considers the purposes
behind the Zimmer
Amendment and looks
at the district and
appellate court rulings in
the Pennsylvania prisoners’ case, Wolf v.Ashcroft. Part
III looks at the history of the MPAA ratings and cases
dealing with their legal enforceability. Finally, Part IV
applies Turner’s test to the Zimmer Amendment and
the Pennsylvania policy prohibiting R, X, and NC-17
movies from being shown in prison, ultimately
concluding that the Zimmer Amendment is
unconstitutional because it impermissibly relies on
the MPAA ratings.

of the doctrine is provided by the case of Ex parte
Pickens.9 In that case, a prisoner in Alaska challenged
his imprisonment in an overcrowded cell, with a

FROM

the drafting of the Constitution
until the 1960s, federal courts applied the
“Hands-Off ” Doctrine, under which the
courts refused to hear prisoners’ claims based
on the idea that courts should not interfere
with the treatment of inmates in prison unless they are illegally confined.

I. Federal Courts’ Review of
Prison Regulation
A. From the Founding until
the 1960s
There was a time, not so very long
ago, when prisoners were regarded
as ‘slave[s] of the State,’ having ‘not
only forfeited [their] liberty, but all
[their] personal rights.’5
From the drafting of the Constitution until
the 1960s,6 federal courts applied the “Hands-Off”
Doctrine, under which the courts refused to hear
prisoners’ claims.7 The central tenet of the “Hands
Off” doctrine was that courts should not interfere
with the treatment of inmates in prison unless they
are illegally confined.8 Perhaps the best illustration

coal stove presenting “the ever present possibility
of fire” and no method of escape.10 The Court
recognized that “the place [was] not fit for human
habitation” and that cramming so many prisoners
into such a small and dangerous cell constituted a
“fabulous obscenity.”11 Nonetheless, consistent with
the Hands-Off Doctrine, the court held that “the
punishment now suffered by the petitioner, while
inexcusable and shocking to the sensibilities of all
civilized persons, is not of such nature as… to justify
discharge of the petitioner at this time.”12
When reviewing prisoners’ rights claims at
the time when the “Hands Off” doctrine was still
in place, courts advanced five general reasons given
by courts for failing to question prison policies: “(1)
separation of powers; (2) federalism; (3) judicial
incompetence in prison administration; (4) fear of
undermining prison disciplinary schemes; and (5)
desire to avoid a flood of litigation.”13

B. The 1960s - Early 1970s
In the 1960s, several federal district courts
began to acknowledge that prisoners retained at
least some Constitutional rights. More generally,
courts simply recognized that “the penal system
[had] failed to achieve its public protection, crime
reduction, and offender rehabilitation objectives.”14
This recognition initially resulted in district courts
reconsidering how they dealt with prisoners’ rights
and then eventually intervening in more cases
dealing with prisoners’ rights.15
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The United States Supreme Court first gave
prisoners’ claims legal support by unofficially
revitalizing 42 U.S.C. § 198316 in Monroe v. Pape.17
Section 1983 allows civil actions for government
deprivations of constitutional rights. In Monroe,
the Court found that federal courts were obligated
to hear claims that state officials were violating
federal rights.18 Even before the Supreme Court
explicitly acknowledged that prisoners could bring
claims under section 1983, state and federal courts
had considered prisoners’ claims based on the
Court’s opinion in Monroe.19
In the 1964 case of Cooper v. Pate, 20 the
Court recognized that prisoners could bring claims
under section 1983, explicitly legitimizing prisoners’

IN

the Court responded to this pressure by recognizing
that inmates could bring certain claims that their
rights had been violated by the government.

C. The mid-1970s: Tearing
Down the Iron Curtain
There is no iron curtain drawn
between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.28
In acknowledgment of lower court decisions,
the Supreme Court in 1974 recognized that
prisoners’ rights are not categorically eviscerated
when they pass through prison walls. In Wolff v.
McDonnell, the Supreme
Court
specifically
rejected the State’s
contention
that
“prisoners in state
institutions are wholly
without the protections
of the Constitution and
the Due Process
Clause.”29
In Pell v. Procunier,30
Justice
Marshall’s
concurrence established
the “retained rights”
doctrine that would
eventually be adopted by the Court.31 The Court’s
holding reflects the doctrine that a prisoner “retains
all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from
him by law.”32 This “retained rights” doctrine has
guided the Court’s analysis for the last several
decades.33
The Court filled in the substance of this
doctrine by establishing the standard of review for
prisoner’s rights cases in Procunier v. Martinez,34 the
first prisoner’s rights case the Supreme Court
decided on its merits.35 The case concerned the
constitutionality of two prison regulations. The first
regulation restricted inmates’ personal
correspondences, 36 while the second regulation
categorically prohibited lawyers from using law
students and legal paraprofessionals to interview
prisoners.37 Instead of focusing on the prisoners’
rights, the Court determined that the regulations
unconstitutionally infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of non-prisoners to communicate

acknowledgement of lower court decisions, the Supreme Court in 1974 recognized that prisoners’ rights are not categorically eviscerated when they pass through
prison walls.
suits.21 In Cooper, the Court addressed a prisoner’s
claim that he had been denied “permission to
purchase certain religious publications” and other
unspecified privileges.22 Although the Court did not
reach the merits of Cooper’s claim, it reversed the
district court’s dismissal of Cooper’s complaint.23
Additionally, the Court recognized that prisoners
retain some rights while in prison and that courts
can hear cases where prisoners allege their rights
have been unlawfully violated.24
The Court’s decision in Cooper was
prompted by increased pressure from two primary
sources. First, prisoners themselves were becoming
more proactive. 25 For instance, Black Muslims
launched a number of attacks against the
discriminatory treatment they endured because of
their religious practices.26 Second, whereas inmates
were previously forced to proceed pro se, they now
were supported by new public and private funding
for legal representation for prison litigants.27 Rather
than deciding to continue to deny inmates’ claims,
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freely with the prisoners. 38 As such, the Court
invalidated the regulations using a strict scrutiny
standard of review,39 finding that the regulation was
not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
governmental interest.
Later that year, the Court made clear that a
much more deferential standard applies when a
prison regulation impinges solely upon a prisoner’s
rights. In Pell v. Procunier,40 the Court considered the
constitutionality of a prison regulation restricting
inmates’ ability to be interviewed by the press.41
Initially, the Court found no violation of the First
Amendment rights of the press because the press
has the same right of access to prisoners as the
general public.42
Unlike in Martinez, Pell solely focused on the
rights of prisoners. Rather than adopting Martinez’s
searing strict scrutiny standard, the Pell decision held
that prison policies impinging solely on prisoner’s
rights were to be judged under the more deferential
reasonableness standard.43 Using this standard, the
Court should then engage in an ad hoc balancing
test, measuring inmates’ rights against the legitimate
penological interests of the state.44 If a court finds
that the state reasonably balanced individual rights
against state interests in enacting a prison policy, the
policy should be held to be constitutional.45

D. Turner v. Safley46 and the
Court’s Current Test
For over a decade, the Court decided
prisoner’s right’s cases under Pell’s deferential
balancing test.47 However, lower courts’ application
of the Pell test resulted in inconsistent reasoning and
results.48 Because of this lack of consistency across
circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the Eighth Circuit case, Turner v. Safley.49
Turner involved two class action suits against
Missouri prison regulations.50 The first regulation
prohibited correspondence between inmates at
different penal institutions unless “the classification/
treatment team of each inmate deems it in the best
interest of the parties involved.”51 The inmates
challenged this regulation on the ground that it
abrogated First Amendment free speech rights. The
second regulation prevented inmates from marrying
unless they received “permission of the prison,
and…such approval should be given only ‘when there
are compelling reasons to do so.’”52 The prisoners
challenged this regulation on the ground that it

violated their right to marry under the due process
clause.
The Court held that prison regulations
violating prisoners’ constitutional rights are valid if
they are reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.53 Several factors are relevant to determine
whether a regulation is reasonable:
First, there must be a ‘valid, rational
connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward
to justify it….A second factor…is
whether there are alternative means
of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates….A third
consideration is the impact
accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources
generally….Finally, the absence of
ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison
regulation.54
Applying this test, the Court upheld the
regulation of inmate correspondence but struck
down the regulation limiting marriage. Specifically,
the correspondence regulation was “content
neutral, it logically advance[d] the goals of
institutional security and safety… and it [wa]s not
an exaggerated response to those objectives.”55
Conversely, the regulation of marriage was not
based on a legitimate penological interest, and the
prison’s policy was an exaggerated response.56
This new test is substantially more
deferential to the interests of the state than Pell’s
balancing test. Under Pell, courts would weigh
prisoners’ rights directly against the state’s
interests. However, under Turner, prisoners’ rights
are completely subordinated to penological
interests. The Turner test thus means that if the
state can cite a rational relationship between its
policy and the interests it seeks to serve, the court
need not even look at the nature of the right
involved. This has caused Justice Brennan to label
Turner’s test “categorically deferential.” 57
Nonetheless, despite serious questions about
Turner’s wisdom, 58 it remains the controlling
constitutional standard for prison policies.
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II. The Zimmer Amendment
and the Present Lawsuit
In January of 1995, Congressman Dick
Zimmer first introduced the Zimmer Amendment,
which I will refer to as the Amendment, also known
as the “No Frills Prison Act,” 59 as part of the
Republican “Contract with America.” One of the
provisions of the Amendment is that “none of the
funds appropriated or otherwise made available to
the Bureau of Prisons shall be used to provide…the
viewing of R, X, and NC-17 rated movies, through
whatever medium presented….”60 Congress initially
enacted the Amendment as section 611 of the
Omnibus Budget Act of Fiscal Year 1997 and has reenacted the Amendment every year.61
The basis for the Amendment was a belief
that “’[p]risons should be places of detention and
punishment; prison perks undermine the concept of jails
as a deterrence. They also waste taxpayer money….’”62
Zimmer felt that some criminals believed that life in
jail was an acceptable alternative to the “real” world
because of a perceived
increase in available
luxuries.63 The purpose
of the Amendment,
therefore, was to
eliminate these luxuries.
Zimmer felt that the
Amendment achieved
this goal by requiring
federal prisons to
provide the minimal
amount of luxuries (i.e.,
basic food, clothing, and
other
necessities)
without denying them
constitutional rights or
causing disciplinar y
problems because of
harsh
prison
conditions.64
In order to comply with the Zimmer
Amendment, a federal penitentiary in McKean,
Pennsylvania, instituted a policy that “[n]o movies
rated R, X, or NC-17 may be shown to inmates.”65
Inmates objected to the categorical nature of this
prohibition and to the Zimmer Amendment. A class
action suit on behalf of federal prisoners was soon

filed by Jere Krakoff, an attorney with the
Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project in Pittsburgh.66
The prisoners argued that certain R-rated films such
as “Schindler’s List,” “Amistad,” “Glory,” and “The
English Patient’” should not be banned in prison.67
In defense of their censorship of these films, the
government pointed to several legitimate penological
interests supporting a categorical ban: “that the
movies posed security risks …that the absence of
such movies deterred people from committing
crimes, [and] that denial of such movies fosters
rehabilitation.”68
The prisoners’ case was heard before the
United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania after a federal magistrate hearing.69
The Magistrate had advised that the court should
not make a decision under Turner until an evidentiary
record was developed.70 In a four page opinion
contradicting the recommendation of the federal
magistrate, District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin found
for the government, 71 finding that legitimate
penological interests supported the government’s
policy. However, the District Court did not state
which interest it found legitimate or why it found

IN

January of 1995, Congressman Dick
Zimmer first introduced the Zimmer
Amendment,...also known as the “No Frills
Prison Act.” It provides that “none of the funds
appropriated or otherwise made available to
the Bureau of Prisons shall be used to
provide...the viewing of R, X, and NC-17 rated
movies...”
the interest to be legitimate.72 The District Court
also declined to engage in a substantive analysis of
whether the government’s policy was rationally
related to a legitimate interest. Instead, the District
Court dismissively claimed to adopt the “common
sense” approach to the Turner reasonableness test
as had been accepted by the Third Circuit73 in
Waterman v. Farmer.74
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Turner’s final three
factors without applying
any of the factors to the
prisoners’ case. 82 The
Third Circuit rejected
this approach, stressing
that a successful
application of Turner must
include an analysis of
each of Turner’s four
prongs.83
According to
the Third Circuit, the first
Turner factor can be
dispositive only in favor
of a prisoner challenge, for “if the connection is
arbitrary or irrational, then ‘the regulation fails,
irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its
favor.’”84 Turner’s first factor is thus only “foremost”
in cases where the prison policy is truly arbitrary.85
Judicial reasoning that satisfies the first factor in no
way “subsum[es] the rest of the inquiry,”86 and a
court “must then proceed to consider the remaining
Turner factors in order to draw a conclusion as to
the policy’s overall reasonableness.” 87 Thus, the
Zimmer Amendment could not be upheld by a court
solely because it satisfies Turner’s first factor.

have been regulated in the
United States for more than a century. The
first recorded incident of censorship occurred
in 1894, when “Dorolita’s Passion Dance,” an
“erotic dance” kinetoscope, was withdrawn
from circulation.
The prisoners appealed the decision, and
Judge Marjorie Rendell delivered the opinion in which
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court.75 The Third Circuit first found the
District Court’s opinion “deficient in that it never
stated or described the interest purportedly served
by the prison policy, nor did it determine whether
the interest was neutral and legitimate.”76
The Third Circuit also rejected the ‘common
sense’ approach taken by the District Court in finding
that the prison policy was rationally related to
legitimate penological interests. The Third Circuit
held that “while the connection may be a matter of
common sense in certain instances …there may be
situations in which the connection is not so apparent
and does require factual development.”77 Ostensibly
questioning the legitimacy of the government’s
interest in crime deterrence by banning R and NC17 movies, the Third Circuit asked whether it “is a
matter of common sense, as was argued here, that
prohibiting movies rated R or NC-17 deters the
general public from committing crimes, lest they be
sent to prison where they are not permitted to
watch R-rated movies?”78 The simple answer was
that the Court was “not so sure,”79 stressing that
the District Court had several questions left to
answer on remand. Specifically, the District Court
would have to “describe the interest served [by the
policy], consider whether the connection between
the policy and the interest is obvious or attenuated
– and thus, to what extent some foundation or
evidentiary showing is necessary.”80
The Third Circuit further held that the
District Court inappropriately applied the Turner test.
The District Court merely held that the prison policy
satisfied Turner’s first prong81 and then referenced

III. The Motion Picture Association of America’s (MPAA)
Ratings
A. The History of Movie
Ratings
Movies have been regulated in the United
States for more than a century. The first recorded
incident of censorship occurred in 1894, when
“Dorolita’s Passion Dance”, an “erotic dance”
kinetoscope,88 was withdrawn from circulation.89 In
1908, New York City mayor George McClellan closed
all local nickelodeons on Christmas.90 Films were
often censored under the rubric of other reasons.
For example, McClellan’s act was primarily motivated
by both moral values and anti-Semitism, as Jewish
theater owners would be hurt the most by the
shutdowns.91 A few weeks later, a group of New York
clergymen attempted to prevent theater owners
from showing films on Sundays.92 This growing
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tension between religion and politics led to a number
of private protests. Finally, the People’s Institute in
New York City, a liberal-reformist group, announced
a plan to establish a censorship board in March
1909. 93
Religious
industry members were
simultaneously meeting
to create a selfregulation system at the
national level,94 called
the National Board of
Censorship.95
The Board first
met on March 25, 1909,
and soon became
known for “reasonable
administration
of
content censorship.”96
Despite the Board’s
efforts, many people still
protested the modified
movies. These protesters gained substantial political
power, and soon directed local police to “terrorize
exhibitors in defiance of the industry’s self-regulatory
apparatus.”97 While some of these efforts were
organized by private citizens, several city and state
governments had also created censorship boards by
1911.98
In response to these private organizers,
industry members at a 1914 National Exhibitors’
Convention cited local censorship as theater owners’
most significant problem nationwide.99 At the same
time, it was becoming increasingly evident that the
moderate National Board of Censorship lacked the
clout to prevent increasing grassroots activism.100
Consequently, the former National Board of
Censorship reorganized itself as the National Board
of Review and attempted to insulate the film industry
from local regulation.101
This attempt was to no avail, as the Supreme
Court made self-regulation by the film industry even
more difficult in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio.102 In Mutual Film Corporation, the
Court upheld an Ohio statute creating a censoring
board. Anyone desiring to show a film in Ohio had
to screen the film before the board, which only
approved those films it found to be “of a moral,
educational, or amusing and harmless character.”103
The Court held that movies are not
protected as free expression under the First
Amendment; rather, movies are “a business, pure and

simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other
spectacles, not to be regarded…as part of the press
of the country, or as organs of public opinion.”104
While the Court recognized that movies could be

THE

Supreme Court held that movies are
not protected as free expression under the
First Amendment. While the Court recognized
that movies could be entertaining, it also cautioned that they are “capable of evil, having felt
power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of expression.”
entertaining, it also cautioned that they are “capable
of evil, having power for it, the greater because of
their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.”105
After the Mutual Film Corporation decision,
state legislatures promptly began considering how
to regulate the motion picture industry. By 1922,
legislatures in thirty-six states were considering bills
allowing film censorship.106 That same year, the
motion picture industry decided to take drastic selfcensoring measures to insulate its movies from local
censorship. Thus, it formed the Motion Picture
Producers and Distributors of America (“MPPDA”),
the predecessor of the current Motion Picture
Association of America (“MPAA”).107
The MPPDA established the draconian Hays
Office Production Code,108 which contained a strict
set of rules preventing the showing of “immoral”
conduct on film.109 The Code had many guidelines
long since forgotten in contemporary Hollywood:
“For example, open mouth kissing was prohibited; a
man and woman in bed, whether married or not
had to keep one leg on the floor; verbal profanity
was not allowed; bad guys did not escape justice.”110
The Code was enforced by the Production Code
Administration (PCA), an in-house agency connected
with California.111 If a film contained “forbidden”
elements, the PCA would refuse to affix the film
with the Production Code seal of approval.112 While
the Code system was voluntary, failure to procure a
seal essentially meant that a film would not be
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released because the big studios would not distribute
films without the PCA seal of approval.113
Many complained that the Code “stifled
creativity,” but that was exactly the point.114 The
MPPDA was willing to
enforce strict selfimposed guidelines to
deter states from moving
forward with legislation
that would prevent
completed films from
being shown in different
parts of the country. On
this front, the Hayes
Code was largely
successful. By 1925, all
but one of the thirty-six states considering local
censorship withdrew their attempts, allowing Hayes
and the MPPDA to create national standards.115
Twenty-three years later, the Supreme Court
would fundamentally change the way motion pictures
are made and distributed in the United States. In
U.S. v. Paramount Pictures,116 the Court overturned
the Court’s argument in Mutual Film Corporation that
movies were not protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, made
clear that “moving pictures, like newspapers and radio,
are included in the press whose freedom is
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”117
After Paramount, filmmakers began violating
the Hayes Code standards.118 In response, many
states began banning films that were not PCA
approved. However, based on Douglas’ opinion in
Paramount, the Court proceeded to strike down
several state board bans of certain ‘offensive’ films.
The net result of these decisions was that state
censorship of films became virtually impossible.119
Frustration at the state level resulted in a
concomitant increase in activism at the grassroots
level.120 The reappearance of censorship at the local
level was especially troublesome because local movie
theaters need a positive relationship with the
community to survive. 121 Rather than upset the
community by showing prohibited films or
challenging the prohibitions in court, movie theaters
generally capitulated to the grassroots activism.122
This local censorship put the movie industry in a
worse position than when studios voluntarily
adhered to PCA guidelines because local censors
often targeted films that they had not even viewed.123
Additionally, while filmmakers could appeal decisions

of the PCA and have some overturned, there was
no local appeals process.124 Box office revenue
steadily declined for two decades because of this
external censorship. The Supreme Court then

RATHER

than upset the community by
showing prohibited films or challenging the
prohibitions in court, movie theaters generally capitulated to the grassroots activism.
stepped in and decided two crucial cases in 1968
which allowed the MPAA to overhaul the ratings
system: Ginsberg v. New York and Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. City of Dallas.125
In Ginsberg v. New York, 126 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a New York
statute criminalizing the sale of obscene material to
minors under the age of 17. The statute prohibited
sales of materials obscene to minors, even if the same
materials would not be considered obscene to
adults.127 The Supreme Court upheld the statute on
the basis of “variable obscenity, the notion that a book
or film might be made available to adults that would
and should otherwise be banned for minors.”128
That same day, the Court decided Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas.129 In Interstate Circuit, Inc.,
the Court held a Dallas censoring board decision
classifying the film “Viva Mira” as “not suitable for
young persons” to be unconstitutional.130 The Court
held that the standards used by the board to classify
films were too vague and that “[i]t is essential that
legislation aimed at protecting children from allegedly
harmful expression…be clearly drawn and that the
standards adopted be reasonably precise.” 131
However, Justice Marshall then immediately
cautioned that it was not the Court’s place to draft
such legislation.132
The MPAA read the Court’s decision in
Interstate Circuit, Inc. as authorization to create a
narrowly drawn private ratings system applicable to
minors.133 The MPAA had already been undergoing
changes since 1966, when it appointed Lyndon
Johnson’s assistant Jack Valenti as its third President.134
Recognizing the need for self-classification to avoid
local censorship, Valenti initially auditioned the
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Suggested for Mature Audiences (“SMA”) rating to
allow studios to experiment with more controversial
topics. 135 Still, Valenti
never saw this rating as
anything more than an
“interim solution.”136
After
1968,
Valenti had the legal
precedent necessary to
mobilize the movie
industry into creating a
universal,
internal
classification procedure
that would largely
prevent local censorship.
Looking at Interstate
Circuit Inc., Valenti thought that it “’said something
that had a seminal ring to it, and it rang like a twanging
wire through the whole fabric of viewing movies:
They said children could be barred from seeing
movies but no one could bar adults from seeing
movies.’”137 Valenti disagreed with legal censorship
via classification, but understood the importance of
a responsible reputation for MPAA.138 After Interstate
Circuit Inc., Valenti had the authority to create a
voluntary self-classification system.139 The MPAA and
other film groups therefore created a new voluntary
film rating system in November 1968.140
What this rating system is not about is
almost as important as what it is about. In his
personal statement accompanying the adoption of
the new rating system, Valenti noted that “there is
‘no valid evidence…that movies have anything to
do with anti-social behavior.’” 141 The system’s
purpose, then, is to warn parents against letting their
children view a particular film. The ratings themselves
do not censor or “even make a final evaluation on
[the suitability of the film for minors]; except for
the X-rating, the parent’s decision remain[s] the key
to children’s attendance.”142 Valenti particularly noted
that the MPAA ratings should not be the final
standard used by parents in determining whether
their children should see a film. Instead, Valenti
recommended the ratings as merely a starting point,
asserting that parents should also read magazines
and local newspapers to determine what films they
feel are appropriate for their children.143
This goal of parental notification is the only
goal of the system, and “[t]he only objective of the
ratings is to advise the parent in advance so he or
she may determine the possible suitability or

unsuitability of viewing by children.” 144 Valenti
explicitly argued that the ratings’ relevance pertained

AFTER

1968, Valenti had the legal precedent necessary to mobilize the movie industry into creating a universal, internal classification procedure that would largely prevent local censorship.
only to minors: “Inherent in the rating system is the
fact that to those 17 and over, or without children,
the ratings have little if any meaning.”145
The MPAA ratings are enforced by the
MPAA-created Classification and Rating
Administration (CARA). CARA is a full-time board
of seven members, and no qualifications are required
for board members to serve.146 The Board reviews
the film using four criteria – theme, language, nudity
and sex, and violence. 147 A majority vote is required
to set the rating, whether a G, PG, PG-13, R, or NC17 rating.148 No one criterion is weighed more heavily
than any other in arriving at a rating, but the MPAA
has come up with basic general descriptions of
movies receiving each of the ratings.149 While the
rating system is voluntary, the great majority of
producers submit their films to CARA to be rated.150
The movie makers may make cuts based on
CARA suggestions, or they may appeal to the Ratings
Appeal Board. This board consists of twenty-four
members of the MPAA, the National Association of
Theater Owners (NATO), and the International Film
Importers & Distributors of America (IFIDA).151 After
all sides present their case, the Board votes by secret
ballot and can reverse CARA’s decision only by a
two-thirds vote.152 The movie industry’s adoption of
CARA immediately led to the decline, and ultimately
the extinction, of all local censorship boards.153 While
the MPAA ratings have gone largely unchallenged in
the last three decades, three plaintiffs have
successfully challenged the constitutionality of the
government’s reliance of the ratings.
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B. Cases Dealing with Movie
Ratings
The first case to challenge the MPAA ratings
was Motion Picture Association of America v. Specter.154
Specter concerned a new amendment to
Pennsylvania’s Penal Code. 155 In finding the
amendment unconstitutional, the district court noted
“that the Code and Rating Administration has…no
defined standards or criteria against which to
measure its ratings.”156 Instead, “[f]ilms viewed are
simply graded according to the individual reactions
of the viewing members.” 157 Consequently, the
amendment was “patently vague and lacking in any
ascertainable standards… and the attempted
recourse to Association ratings [wa]s of no avail.”158
To some extent, Specter tells us little about
whether the prison policy in Wolf or the “No Frills

AS

motion pictures as “…any motion picture which is
rated under the Rating Program of the Motion
Picture Association of America in a category
recommending that minors, unaccompanied by a
parent or guardian, be denied admission.’”162 When
a movie theater denied certain minors admission to
the R-rated “Woodstock” when accompanied by
adults, the minors challenged the ordinance as a prior
restraint on their First Amendment rights.163 As in
Specter, the court found that, “if the Motion Picture
Association utilized any standards in reaching its
judgments as to what is an ‘adult’ movie, the
defendants are not aware of what these standards
are.”164
Later, in Eastern Federal Corporation v.Wasson,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina considered a
law that levied twenty percent license tax on all
tickets sold to X rated movies.165 The court found
that the law was
unconstitutional because
it “impose[d] no
guidelines for rating of
films…leav[ing] the
determination solely to
the discretion of the
MPAA.”166 In contrast to
Wasson, a Wisconsin
District Court in Borger
v. Bisciglia 167 upheld a
school district’s reliance
on MPAA ratings when
the school denied a
student’s request to see the movie “Schindler’s List.”
The school’s principal, acting at the behest of several
teachers, initially sent a letter to the superintendent
requesting permission for teachers to be able to take
their students to the film during school hours.168
The superintendent denied the request solely on
the basis that the MPAA had given the film an R
rating. The film therefore was “banned from the
curriculum” by school district policy.169 After this
rejection, a student passed a petition around school
requesting that the school board reconsider its
decision.170 The School Board took no action, and
the students legally challenged the board’s reliance
on the MPAA ratings.171
Because Borger involved school
administration, the court used the rational basis test:
“whether or not the defendants’ decision bore a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate pedagogical
concern.”172 The court initially found that the school

in Spector, the court found that, “if the
Motion Picture Association utilized any standards in reaching its judgments as to what is
an ‘adult’ movie, the defendants are not aware
of what these standards are.”
Prison Act” is constitutional. Specter was a case
involving the restriction of First Amendment rights
and Pennsylvania’s Amendment was thus subjected
to strict scrutiny. In contrast, under Turner, the state
only need prove that its regulation was rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest. At the
same time, the court was clear that, even with the
MPAA ratings, the Pennsylvania Amendment in
Specter lacked “any ascertainable standards.”159 It is
difficult to see, then, how the Pennsylvania law in
Wolf or the “No Frills Prison Act” – both relying
exclusively on the MPAA ratings – could even bear
a rational relationship to any legitimate penological
interests.
A month later, a Wisconsin District Court
reached a similar conclusion in Engdahl v. City of
Kenosha. 160 Kenosha adopted an ordinance that
prevented individuals under age 18 from being able
to see “adult” films.161 The ordinance defined ‘adult
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district presented a “legitimate pedagogical concern,”
namely, to prevent its students from watching films
with excessive nudity, violence, and bad language.173
The court found that reliance on the MPAA ratings
was rationally related to this interest, finding that “a
private organization’s rating system cannot be used
to determine whether a movie receives
constitutional protection.”174 As opposed to the
decisions of other bodies, decisions made by school
boards about curriculum need only be rationally
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.175 In
Borger, the court held that the school board had
presented enough evidence – such as MPAA press
releases – to establish that reliance on MPAA ratings
to ban films was rationally related to protecting
school children from obscene material.176
Borger still stands as the only case to uphold
the MPAA ratings against constitutional attack by
finding that the use of the ratings bore a rational
relationship to the government’s purported interest.
Borger, however, is inapplicable to Wolf. Superficially,
Borger seems highly similar to Wolf. Both involve
challenges to policies banning films based solely on
their MPAA ratings. One of the movies cited by the
Wolf petitioners – “Schindler’s List” – was the same
movie at issue in Borger. Finally, the standard of review
in Borger – the rational basis test – is the same
standard that is applied to the prison policy in Wolf.
What this comparison ignores, however, is that the
MPAA rating systems are intended only to guide

TURNER

IV. Applying the Turner Test
to Wolf v. Ashcroft
A. How to Apply Turner’s Four
Factor Test
Turner’s factors are (1) whether there is a
rational relationship between the prison policy and
relevant penological interests; (2) the alternative
means of expressing the right left open by the policy;
(3) the impact of accommodating the prisoners’
rights; and (4) potential alternatives to the prison’s
policy. Turner never explicitly states the relative
importance of each factor or how courts should go
about implementing the test. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit has noted that “Turner [does not]…require
a court to weigh evenly, or even consider each of
these factors.”179
The majority of courts, however, have not
applied Turner’s test as deferentially as the Sixth
Circuit. In Wolf, the Third Circuit remanded because
“the District Court did not apply the factors at all.”180
The Third Circuit explicitly held that, “[o]n remand,
if the District Court again concludes that the first
factor is satisfied, it must then proceed to consider
the remaining Turner factors.”181
Previously, the Third Circuit did establish that
the first factor can be
dispositive, although all
the
factors
are
interrelated
and
incorporated into the
‘reasonableness’ analysis.
In Waterman v. Farmer, the
Third Circuit held that,
“[a]lthough the factors
are intended to serve as
guides to a single reasonableness standard, ‘the first
factor looms especially large’ because it ‘tends to
encompass the remaining factors, and some of its
criteria are apparently necessary conditions.’”182
However, as Judge Rendell noted in Wolf, the first
factor is the most important only in the sense that
lack of a rational connection between the prison
policy and legitimate penological interests
automatically means the policy is unconstitutional.
Even if the state fulfills the first factor, the analysis

never explicitly states the
relative importance of each factor or how
courts should go about implementing the test.
parents in deciding what films their children should
watch.177 Any penological interest the government
has, therefore, has no rational relationship to using
the MPAA rating system when censoring movies
before an over-16 audience. This admitted limitation
on the applicability and utility of the MPAA ratings
beyond situations involving children lays the
foundation for the argument that the Zimmer
Amendment’s absolute reliance on the ratings fails
under Turner’s rational basis test.178
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supporting that determination in no way subsumes
the rest of the inquiry.183

B. The First Factor: A Rational
Connection Between Policies
and Interests
While some have suggested that the first
factor requires heightened scrutiny, most courts have
held that this factor is the equivalent of rational basis
review.184 Ostensibly, this
deferential standard
lends credence to the
validity of Pennsylvania’s
law prohibiting prisoners
from viewing R, X, and
NC-17 rated films. An
incorrect analysis would
merely require that
Pennsylvania’s ban on R
and NC-17 films be
rationally related to
some
legitimate
penological interest. In
this case, however, as in other prison censorship
cases, the analysis is much more akin to an equal
protection analysis.

or fourth class mail” to be unconstitutional.188 In
the limited sense, the policy was ‘rational’ in that
such mail could contain illegal contraband. However,
this did not explain why the prison did not similarly
prohibit prisoners from receiving first and second
class mail.Thus, although the prison could prove that
bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail sometimes
contains contraband, it could not present any
evidence that such contraband appeared with any

TO

satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the state must
prove it has rational reasons for its disparate
treatment of R, X, and NC-17 films and G,
PG, and PG-13 rated films.

(1) Morrison v. Hall185 and the
Equal Protection Analysis
To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state must prove it has
rational reasons for its disparate treatment of R, X,
and NC-17 films and G, PG, and PG-13 rated films.
In Morrison, the Ninth Circuit found a prison policy
prohibiting prisoners from receiving “bulk rate, third,
or fourth class mail” to be unconstitutional.186 In
the limited sense, the policy was ‘rational’ in that
such mail could contain illegal contraband. However,
this did not explain why the prison did not similarly
prohibit prisoners from receiving first and second
class mail.Thus, although the prison could prove that
bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail sometimes
contains contraband, it could not present any
evidence that such contraband appeared with any
less frequency in first or second class mail.187
To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state must prove it has
rational reasons for its disparate treatment of R, X,
and NC-17 films and G, PG, and PG-13 rated films.
In Morrison, the Ninth Circuit found a prison policy
prohibiting prisoners from receiving “bulk rate, third,

less frequency in first or second class mail.189 In order
to fulfill Turner’s first factor, the prison would have
“to submit…evidence demonstrating a rational
connection between the postage rate at which a
publication is sent and the risk of contraband.”190
Similarly, in order for the Zimmer Amendment or
the Pennsylvania policy to pass constitutional muster,
the state must be able to prove a rational connection
between a film’s MPAA rating and some legitimate
penological interest.
Judge Rendell (the Third Circuit judge who
remanded Wolf v.Ashcroft), the history of the Zimmer
amendment, and the Zimmer Amendment itself seem
to indicate that the Amendment’s main purpose is
to create a harsher prison environment. However,
banning certain films may not actually create a
harsher prison environment.A recent comprehensive
study of film profits determined that PG films are
more than twice as likely to gross at least $25 million
domestically than R-rated films.191 Further, the study
also found R-rated films are less profitable on average
than G, PG, and PG-13 films. 192 Movie studios
recognize that PG and PG-13 movies have a greater
potential to yield greater profits, and thus edit movies
with the highest earning potential so that they are
not rated-R. Many movies, therefore, that remain
rated-R are actually those with limited commercial
prospects. While there might be arguments to the
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contrary, neither those
drafting, nor those
defending, the legislation
in question have
presented any evidence
that prisoners prefer Rrated films. Without
such evidence, there is
no reason to disrupt the
general rule that people,
as well as prisoners, on
average prefer to see PG
and PG-13 movies
instead of R-rated
movies.
According to
the District Court in
Wolf, the second
potential purpose of the
ban on films rated R,
NC-17, or X is to
facilitate the rehabilitation of prisoners.193 The
argument here is that prisoners exposed to excessive
sex and violence in R, X, and NC-17 rated films may
remain desensitized to pernicious behavior. However,
CARA “does not rate for quality or lack of it” when
giving a film a MPAA rating.194 A movie with an
excessive amount of violence will be given an Rrating, whether the movie glorifies violence or
condemns it. Undoubtedly, a state can rationally
argue that an R-rated movie will stunt a prisoner’s
rehabilitation by presenting images that glorify drug
use and violence. However, PG-13 films may also
glorify violence, and R-rated films may present antiviolence messages. For instance, Rob Cohen’s PG13 rated “XXX” and Stephen Spielberg’s “Indiana
Jones and the Temple of Doom” (the film which led
to the somewhat arbitrary creation of the PG-13
rating after Spielberg’s intense lobbying to the MPAA)
contain numerous scenes of excessive violence,
which the audience is supposed to applaud, while
Terrence Malick’s R-rated “The Thin Red Line” is
anti-violence, showing the pernicious effects of the
Battle of Guadalcanal on nature and man alike.
Sometimes, many PG-13 movies can leave a
worse impression on viewers than R-rated films. A
war film with an R-rating such as “Glory” can show
the viewer in graphic detail the atrocities that
resulted from the Civil War. A similar war movie
with a PG-13 rating would contain less violence, but
the viewer would be left with the impression that

SOMETIMES,

many PG-13 movies
can leave a worse impression on viewers than
R-rated films. A war film with an R-rating such
as “Glory” can show the viewer in graphic
detail the atrocities that resulted from the Civil
War. A similar war movie with a PG-13 rating would contain less violence, but the viewer
would be left with the impression that war is
less devastating and that violence has minor
consequences.
war is less devastating and that violence has minor
consequences. However, even if there is some
connection between the MPAA ratings and the state’s
penological interests, an absolute ban would still
constitute an exaggerated response, and run counter
to Turner.

(2) The Prison Policy Must Not
Be An “Exaggerated Response”
Under Turner, a prison’s policy must not be
an “exaggerated response” to the behavior it wishes
to proscribe.195 For instance, in Bazzetta v. McGinnis,196
a state passed a law preventing former inmates from
visiting current prisoners. The Sixth Circuit found
that the state had asserted a legitimate penological
interest: “the prevention of disruption by exconvicts”197 However, the state impermissibly reacted
to this danger by categorically prohibiting all former
inmates from making non-contact visits.198 Because
this policy prohibited all visits without individualized
determinations of danger, many benign visits were
also prevented. The law was therefore held to be
unconstitutional, as it was an impermissible
“exaggerated response” to the potential problems
associated with visits by ex-convicts.199
The absolute ban on all R, X, and NC-17
rated films constitutes a similarly exaggerated
response. Some may well argue that certain films
hinder the rehabilitation of certain prisoners and
lead to antisocial behavior. Although unlikely, a
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potential prisoner might avoid committing a crime
because these movies are banned in prison, making
the prison experience less enjoyable. However, many
films that have neither effect are banned under this
blanket policy. While a prison policy does not require
an exact fit between means and ends, absolute
reliance on the amorphous MPAA ratings is a
particularly ill-fitting solution because MPAA ratings
are irrelevant to adults.

C. The Second Factor:
Alternative Means of Expressing the Right
Turner’s second factor asks courts to look
at whether alternative means of expressing the right
in question remain open to prisoners. Courts have
developed several sub-factors when applying this
factor: defining the right broadly, looking at the
broadness of the exclusion, focusing on the right to
receive information, and holding that violation leads
only to increased scrutiny.200

(1) Defining the Right Broadly
The first part of the analysis of Turner’s
second factor is defining the prisoners’ rights. In
Turner and its progeny, Thornburgh v. Abbot, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that “‘the right’ in question must
be viewed sensibly and expansively.”201 In Thornburgh,
the Court upheld regulations giving prison officials
the power to reject incoming publications they
thought jeopardized institutional security202 because
officials banned only certain publications, allowing a
significant number of publications to be sent and
received.203
Using the same reasoning in O’Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz,204 the Supreme Court examined a policy
preventing prisoners from attending a specific
religious ceremony because of the amalgam of
religious practices already available to the inmates.205
In addressing this issue, first, the Court looked to
the fact that during non-work hours there remained
a near absolute right to congregate for prayer and
discussion.206 Second, the state provided an imam
whom prisoners could freely see.207 Finally, the state
made special arrangements for Ramadan, and offered
alternative meals whenever the prison served
pork.208 After examining these three separate factors,
the court ultimately found no absolute violation of
the prisoners’ right to free exercise of religion. The

Court did not even reach the Turner factors because
of its finding that no right was violated.
Based on the analyses in these cases, it is
clear that petitioners challenging the Zimmer
Amendment cannot simply argue that the right at
issue is their specific right to view R, X, and NC-17
movies (and not some broader right) and that this
right is categorically precluded by the Amendment
to the extent that it prohibits all R, X, and NC-17
movies in prison. Instead, courts have found that
the right must be viewed more expansively; it cannot
be defined solely according to the items that the
regulation excludes. 209 Unfortunately, though,
according to at least one Circuit court, the Supreme
Court has never articulated a clear method for how
to define the right at stake.210

(2) Broader Exclusions Lead to
Fewer Alternatives
Despite this narrow interpretation of Turner’s
second factor, the Court’s analysis in Thornburgh v.
Abbott21 indicates that absolute reliance on the MPAA
ratings is improper. Thornburgh involved a
constitutional challenge to a prison policy allowing
prison officials to exclude any incoming publications
they felt would undermine institutional security.212
However, under the policy, the warden had to review
each publication separately, and could not simply
create a list of excluded publications.213 The Court
was especially “comforted by the individualized
nature of the determinations required by the
regulation” and cautioned that “[a]ny attempt to
achieve greater consistency by broader exclusions
might itself run afoul of the second Turner factor, i.e.,
the presence of ‘alternative means of exercising the
right’ in question.”214
The policy in Wolf or the Zimmer
Amendment should be treated no differently than
the policy in Thornburgh. Ostensibly, both create
blanket prohibitions on R, X, and NC-17 rated films
without requiring or even allowing prison officials
to make individualized determinations about specific
films. In this sense, Wolf is similar to Kikumura v.
Turner,215 where a prison enacted a blanket ban on
all Japanese language publications. In Kikumura, the
court found this policy to be unconstitutional in part
because it categorically prohibited a class of
publications without the individualized analysis the
Supreme Court found essential in Thornburgh.216
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(3) The Right to Receive
Information
While it seems clear that the absolute
prohibition in the Zimmer Amendment is overbroad,
the question of how to define the right in question
remains unanswered. The right could be construed
as “the right to receive information,”217 as it was in
Kikumura. Under this definition, the justification for
finding that the prisoners’ right to information was

WHILE

many of the best historical films receive R ratings,
meaning that prisoners are prohibited from seeing
them under current policy.221
However, to simply argue that prisoners are
being denied the right to information would undercut
the impact of movies on society. An individual can
read about the Holocaust, but that same individual
can be confronted with shocking visual depictions
of the horrors of Nazi Death camps in an entirely
different manner by watching “Schindler’s List.”
Because any film
portraying the horrors
of a pernicious historical
event is likely to receive
an R rating, under
current policy, prisoners
are being denied the
unique opportunity to
vicariously experience
these events and further
understand
what
occurred. While reading
a book about history
gives the reader some
understanding, actually
seeing historical events recreated gives the viewer
an entirely different perspective.

it seems clear that the absolute prohibition in the Zimmer Amendment
is overbroad, the question of how to define
the right in question remains unanswered. The
right could be construed as “the right to receive information.”
violated would be the converse of the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Morrison v. Hall.218 In Morrison, the Court
reviewed the constitutionality of a prison policy that
prevented prisoners from receiving magazines in bulk
rate, third, and fourth class mail. The court struck
the policy down and rejected the argument that
visual media are the equivalent of print media,219
reasoning that the two cannot be conflated because
prisoners have such low literacy rates.220 Visual media
are thus inadequate alternatives to printed words
because they do not allow prisoners to learn the
literacy skills necessary to succeed upon their
reintegration into society.
The converse to this analysis should apply
with equal force. If prisoners cannot read, then their
only method of learning about an event of historical
importance may be through viewing a movie.
Illiteracy may constructively prevent these prisoners
from learning about historical events through the
written word. Further, only films with extreme
depictions of violence may be able to accurately
portray the horrors of the Holocaust, as in
“Schindler’s List”, or of the Civil War, as in “Glory.”
Films with less graphic violence often water down
such pernicious events, making the events seem less
devastating than they actually were. Consequently,

(4) Violation Leads Only to
Increased Scrutiny
No single Turner factor is dispositive. When
a court finds that the second factor has been violated,
the regulation is not necessarily “presumptively
unconstitutional.” Instead, the reviewing court must
simply look at the policy’s justifications with
“increased scrutiny.”222

D. The Third Factor: Impact of
Accommodation - The “Ripple
Effect”
The “ripple effect” refers generally to an
effect that occurs when accommodation of the right
in question would negatively impact other prisoners
and make the jobs of prison officials more difficult.
Unfortunately, courts have implemented Turner’s third
factor in conflicting and often antithetical manners.
Some circuits have held that Turner’s third factor can
only support upholding the prison’s regulation. If
accommodation would negatively impact prison
administration, the regulation is likely rational;
however, the absence of such a negative impact does
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not mean that the prisoner’s right should be
accommodated. These courts have held that,
“[r]ather than allowing prisoners to speculate that
the ripple effect would not be great, the factor allows
prison officials the opportunity to show what impact
accommodating the prisoners’ religious principles
might have on their prisons.”223 Turner does not
phrase this factor as an additional burden on the
state, but as an element which, if proven, should lead
to greater deference to the prison policy.224
Indeed, in Turner, the Supreme Court did
acknowledge that, “[w]hen accommodation of an
asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on
fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be
particularly deferential to the informed discretion
of corrections officials.”225 Conversely, the Turner
Court also recognized that only rare changes will
have no impact on the rights of others or prison
resources.226 Based on this language, other courts
have found that the state cannot prove a prison policy
is constitutional merely
by
showing
that
accommodation will
cause any impact. 227
Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit has held that
“[t]he
obvious
implication…is that a
prison may not restrict
a prisoner’s rights
without even looking to
see how the rights might
be accommodated and
estimating the expense
entailed in doing so.”228 In line with these cases, even
a cursory review of the Zimmer Amendment and
the Pennsylvania policy makes it evident that there
would be no negative “ripple effect” by
accommodating the right of prisoners to see certain
R, X, or NC-17 rated movies.
As previously noted, accommodation of a
right can have a “ripple effect” by negatively impacting
other prisoners or by making the jobs of prison
officials more difficult. An example of the former
effect was found in Waterman v. Farmer.229 In Farmer,
the Third Circuit upheld a regulation on pornographic
materials, reasoning that the alternative, a limited
distribution to certain offenders determined not to
be sexually deviant, would be ineffective because of
the “ripple effect.”230 The court felt this “ripple effect”
would be inevitable because, once the initial prisoners

procured the pornographic material, they would be
“more than likely to pass their material to other
prisoners.”231
Showing certain R-rated films would not
have the same “ripple effect.” Presumably, before
showing R-rated films, prison officials would make
an independent determination that the films did not
encourage violent, sexual, or other anti-social
behavior. However, if prison officials did determine
that a film was not suitable for a particular inmate,
they could simply prevent him from attending the
screening. Unlike in Waterman, the inmates in Wolf
are not asking to possess the material (i.e. by
receiving a videotape); they are simply asking that
specific films be shown. As long as prison officials
deny access to prisoners they feel should not see
certain films, the prisoners will not be exposed to
any dangerous material. Additionally, prison officials
do not need to work harder to maintain security to
prevent the acquisition of file copies by ineligible

COURTS

have been extremely reluctant to find alternatives to prison policies that
achieve the same penological interests without imposing additional burdens on prison
officials.
prisoners because the issue is simply the screening,
not the possession, of films. Consider the previously
cited Ninth Circuit opinion in Morrison v. Hall.232 In
Hall, the Ninth Circuit looked at the potential danger
that prisoners might receive illegal contraband in
different types of mail.233 This concern does not exist
when prisoners are merely viewing movies.

E. The Fourth Factor: Alternatives to the Policy
Courts have been extremely reluctant to find
alternatives to prison policies that achieve the same
penological interests without imposing additional
burdens on prison officials. In Amatel v. Reno,234 for
instance, the D.C. Circuit upheld a ban on the use of
Bureau of Prisons resources to purchase sexually
explicit material for inmates.235 In considering Turner’s
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fourth factor, the D.C. Circuit held that “[t]he most
obvious alternative is a detailed prisoner-by-prisoner
(and presumably publication by publication) sifting
to determine whether a particular publication will
harm the rehabilitation of a particular prisoner. The
costs of this approach seem far from de minimus.”236
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a First
Amendment challenge to inmate hair-grooming
regulations. 237 The Court made clear that an
alternative policy is sufficient only if it is equally
effective when compared to the original policy, stating
that “we can imagine means of achieving the prison’s
stated goals with less restraint on the prisoner’s
rights. Nevertheless, we find it unlikely that all of
the penological interests satisfied by the regulation
could be equally well satisfied by any of the alternatives
proposed by the prisoners.”238
As far as such a stringent application of the
fourth factor of Turner is concerned, the Supreme
Court’s own analysis in Turner suggests an alternative
to prisons’ absolute reliance on MPAA ratings when
censoring certain films. Recall that in Turner, the Court
struck down a marriage regulation “permit [ting] an
inmate to marry only with the permission of the
superintendent of the prison,” even in light of the
fact that to do so the superintendent had to present
compelling reasons.239 The Court found the policy
unconstitutional, in part because of an available
alternative policy which generally permitted
marriages, unless “[the] warden finds that it presents
a threat to security or order of [the] institution, or
to public safety.”240 Clearly, this alternative policy
required wardens to spend more time analyzing each
potential marriage; however, under the alternative
policy the Court shifted the presumption towards
marriage by requiring valid reasons for its prohibition.
In the case of movies, a similar or even less
intrusive alternative could be developed. As in Turner,
the presumption could shift in favor of allowing any
films to be screened, and the warden – perhaps
relying on the MPAA ratings and other factors –
would have to present affirmative reasons for why
particular films should be censored. Alternatively,
the presumption against R, X, and NC-17 movies
could remain intact as long as an appeals process
was in place. Thus, the warden could censor films
based on their MPAA rating, but prisoners would
have the opportunity to argue that some films have
sufficient educational merit and lack the
objectionable material prisons want to prohibit.

Additionally, several alternative ratings
systems exist that prisons could easily use and that
are more descriptive than the MPAA ratings. For
example, the Film Advisory Board (FAB) issues film
ratings closely analogous to the MPAA ratings. The
Board was created in 1988 after independent video
producers asked for a more descriptive film rating
alternative than the MPAA.241 The FAB, like the MPAA,
reviews all released movies, but it states explicitly
why films receive a certain rating, as opposed to the
clandestine decision-making process of the MPAA.242
While the MPAA now does include some content
descriptions, the FAB ratings are much more
thorough in describing objectionable material. Prison
officials could thus use these ratings to more
effectively determine which films they do not want
their prisoners to see.
Another alternative would be the ratings at
“Kids-in-Mind.”243 While the name suggests that the
ratings are geared to children, the web site’s
recommendations are not age-specific.244 Instead, the
site assigns three separate ratings for (1) sex and
nudity, (2) violence and gore, and (3) profanity.245
Each of these categories receives a rating between
zero and ten based on quantity and context.246 This
system would provide prison officials with much
more detailed information than is provided by the
MPAA ratings about whether a film has objectionable
elements. The ratings systems of FAB and Kids-inMind are just two examples of a variety of rating
systems that prison officials could use in lieu of MPAA
ratings.247

F. Dangerous Precedent:
Kimberlin and the Common
Sense Approach
While the Third Circuit has rejected a
common sense approach to the Pennsylvania prison
policy and the Zimmer Amendment,248 the District
Court for the District of Columbia came to the
opposite conclusion in Kimberlin v. United States
Department of Justice.249 This opinion is a departure
from the District Court’s previous mirroring of the
Third Circuit’s approach to Turner.250
Specifically, the court in Kimberlin upheld the
constitutionality of a provision of the Zimmer
Amendment prohibiting the expenditure of federal
funds to purchase electric and electronic instruments
for federal prisoners.251 The court found that,“[w]hile
banning musical instruments by itself, may not actually
deter anyone [from committing a crime], it is possible
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that [the Bureau of Prisons] BOP (and Congress)
thought the ban would indicate to society that prison
is a harsh place where one does not want to be.”252
The court concluded that even though it was
optimistic to believe that excluding these instruments
would have any impact, it was not necessarily
irrational.253

IF

The court misses the point. The ban on
electric instruments or any of the provisions of the
Zimmer Amendment likely do make prison a harsher
place. However, the dispositive question is whether
potential prisoners will be deterred from committing
crimes because of fewer amenities available in prison.
Perhaps it was appropriate in Amatel to use a
common
sense
approach because of
valid reasons for
precluding sexually
deviant offenders from
obtaining pornography.
However, as Judge
Rendell noted in Wolf,
whether
amenity
prohibitions in prison
deter
potential
criminals is a much
more difficult social
science question and
requires factual findings.
The court in Kimberlin also improperly found
that accommodation would have a negative effect
on prison officials solely because the Bureau Of
Prisons (“BOP”) “argue[d] that it [could not]
accommodate plaintiffs without contravening the
Amendment’s legitimate purpose of making prisons
more of a deterrent.”258 If the penological interests
of the prison are served by abrogating a particular
right, then accommodating that right will mean the
prison cannot fully achieve its interest. The BOP’s
argument would thus make Turner’s third factor a
tautology.
The real purpose of Turner’s third factor,
however, is to determine whether accommodation
of the right would also have a “ripple effect.” While
accommodation of the right in Kimberlin might
indirectly have resulted in prison overpopulation,
there were no arguments presented as to why
introducing electronic instruments into prisons
would cause any harm beyond making the prison
environment less harsh. In other words, the BOP
never stated that allowing prisoners to have
electronic instruments would directly lead to any
negative consequences in prison. Similarly, nobody
has presented the similar argument that allowing
prisoners to view R, X, or NC-17 rated films would
directly lead to any negative consequences.

potential criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes because they
know that musical instruments are banned
from prison, there is no reason that they will
be deterred by the general prospect that the
prison environment has become less pleasant.
If this indeed was Congress’s intent when
passing the Zimmer Amendment, it makes little sense.
If potential criminals would not be deterred from
committing crimes because they know that musical
instruments are banned from prison, there is no
reason that they will be deterred by the general
prospect that the prison environment has become
less pleasant. Clearly, the court is not persuaded by
the argument that a potential criminal would be
deterred because his musical talents would be
stunted while in prison. But, the court has apparently
accepted the argument that a potential criminal might
be dissuaded from committing a crime by
remembering that electric instruments are banned
from prison, making prison a “harsh place” he needs
to avoid.
These are tenuous arguments, yet the court
urges acceptance of the latter based on “common
sense.”254 According to his reading of Amatel, Sullivan
argued that a court can find a rational link between
a prison policy and a governmental interest based
on “common sense” without having to rely on record
evidence. 255 Yet Congress passed the Zimmer
Amendment “without fact finding or consulting with
prison officials and administrators.”256 Apparently
using common sense, Sullivan simply concluded that
because “the policy deprives plaintiffs of electrical
instruments as a comfort and amenity, the prison is
somewhat harsher.”257
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V. Conclusion
Courts are currently at an impasse when
dealing with prisoners’ rights cases and the MPAA
ratings. Federal courts had been moving toward a
more active role in vindicating prisoners’ rights
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner. After
Turner, the question remains whether there is any
significant role for federal courts to play in reviewing
prison policies.
The Zimmer Amendment and prison policies
resulting from it have presented federal courts with
the opportunity to apply a stronger standard of
review to prison policies. The provisions of the
Amendment made prison conditions harsher for
prisoners, yet there are no legislative findings that
toughening the prison environment actually deters
potential criminals. When reviewing the Amendment,
district courts in D.C. and Pennsylvania have upheld
the provisions based on a deferential “common
sense” approach. By remanding Wolf v. Ashcroft, the
Third Circuit has expressed its preference that
prisons and Congress use a standard more protective
of prisoners. The district court should now take
advantage of this opportunity by finding that the
Pennsylvania prison policy impermissibly relied on
the MPAA ratings in censoring films because the
MPAA ratings should not be used to ground a rational
basis between prison policy and the state’s interest.
Courts are also at an impasse in deciding
the legal enforceability of the MPAA ratings.
Previously, courts have found the ratings to be
completely amorphous and legally unenforceable.
Now, courts have held that schools and courts may
completely defer to CARA and the MPAA when
censoring films. If courts continue to allow
governmental agencies to rely upon MPAA ratings
when censoring films, courts will be giving too much
power to the MPAA, a private organization, to inform
government censorship decisions based on nebulous
standards. This use was not historically intended by
the MPAA and is not justified. In essence, unless the
Zimmer Amendment is found unconstitutional, a
private organization will be allowed to decide what
films can and cannot be seen by the American public.

* Colin Miller is a 2003 graduate of the William & Mary
School of Law and currently at the law firm Saltman &
Stevens in Washington, D.C.
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G:”General Audiences-All Ages
Admitted.”
This is a film which contains nothing in
theme, language, nudity and sex, violence,
etc. which would, in the view of the
Rating Board, be offensive to parents
whose younger children view the film. The
G rating is not a “certificate of approval,”
nor does it signify a children’s film.
Some snippets of language may go beyond
polite conversation but they are common
everyday expressions. No stronger words
are present in G-rated films. The violence
is at a minimum. Nudity and sex scenes
are not present; nor is there any drug use
content.
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PG:”Parental Guidance Suggested. Some
Material May Not Be Suitable For
Children.”
This is a film which clearly needs to be
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before they let their children attend. The
label PG plainly states that parents may
consider some material unsuitable for
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PG-13:”Parents Strongly Cautioned. Some
Material May Be Inappropriate For
Children Under 13.”
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parents to determine for themselves the
attendance in particular of their younger
children as they might consider some
material not suited for them. Parents, by
the rating, are alerted to be very careful
about the attendance of their underteenage children.
A PG-13 film is one which, in the view of
the Rating Board, leaps beyond the
boundaries of the PG rating in theme,
violence, nudity, sensuality, language, or
other contents, but does not quite fit
within the restricted R category. Any drug
use content will initially require at least a
PG-13 rating. In effect, the PG-13
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must find out more about an R-rated
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